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Abstract 
ECONOMIC EVALUA nON OF 
HEALTH CARE: CAUTIONS FOR THE 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT 
by Jolene Skordis 
Supervisor: Professor Nicoli Nattrass (Department of Economics) 
Health economics has expanded enormouslY as a sub-discipline in the last Jour decades, drawing 
primarilY on the theoretical joundations oj we!Jare economics. The toolkit jor the econ()mic 
evaluation oj health care now extends from the humble cost-minimisation exercise, through cost 
ifJectiveness measures, to the more complex cost utility or cost benefit models. These methodologies 
have differing strengths and drawbacks. This paper evaluates those attributes on both the practical 
and theoretical dimensions. 
On the ,practical dimension: The developing country context dijJers from the wealthier country 
context in a number oj wcrys. This paper considers the differences in resource constraints and the 
differences in health priorities and asks to what extent the methodology is able to accommodate these 
variations. 
On the theoretical dimension: Few health care evalllations are conducted in a Pareto Optimal world. 
This paper considers the extent to which the welfare economic Joundations oj a methodology are 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR HEALTH ECONOMICS 
Health economics has expanded enormously as a sub-discipline in the last four 
decades, drawing on the theoretical foundations of welfare economics and the 
more applied experience of environmental economics and public finance analysis. 
The toolkit for the economic evaluation of health care now extends from the 
humble cost-minimisation exercise, through cost effectiveness measures, to the 
more complex cost utility and cost benefit models. Techniques have evolved to 
supplement clinical data with survey data from the patient and cost data from the 
provider. Composite measures have been devised in an attempt to capture the 
burden of disease and other non-monetary gains from health expenditure. We 
have developed a better understanding of the health care provider as an 
economic and social entity. 
Unfortunately, very little attention has thus far been paid to the accuracy and 
suitability of these measurement techniques in various contexts. What little has 
been written applies most particularly to the case of wealthier countries, despite 
the argument that lower-income countries have the greatest need to optimise 
their allocation of scarce resources. This paper considers the first principles 
foundations of economic evaluation and the particular conditions that may help 
or hinder the economic evaluation of health care in a developing country context. 
Health expenditure comprises a significant and growing proportion of gross 
domestic product in all countries. In the last four decades the percentage of 
GDP expended on health has more that doubled in most higher income 
countries (see Table One).74;91 In sub-Saharan Africa however, the picture is 
slightly different. The 650 million people in sub-Saharan Africa have lower life 











implying more serious health challenges. In 2000/2001, combined public and 
private health spending in South Africa was estimated at 4.2% of GDP*, down 
from the 5.6% estimated by Peters et al 68 for 1990. On average in the 
Saharan region, total government expenditure comprised 25.5% of GDP between 
1990-1996. Of this, Education comprised 3.5%, Defence comprised 3% and 
Health comprised only 1.7%.68 The provision of health services consumes 
substantial resources and the countries with the most dire health problems 
allocate less of their available resources to health care. 
Table One 
TOTAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
EU 3.9 5.2 7.1 7.6 
Australia 4.5 5.7 7.4 7.5 
Canada 5.5 7.1 7.41 9.0 
Japan 2.9 4.4 6.41 6.5 
UK 3.9 4.5 5.6 6.1 
USA 5.3 7.5 9.3 12.4 
Source.l4,91 
The World Health Organisation's Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
has recently published a report stating that the link between the overall health of a 
population and a country's economic growth is far stronger than previously 
thought.91;97 











The same WHO report identifies the main causes of avoidable deaths in low-
income countries as: HIV / AIDS; malaria; tuberculosis (IB); childhood infectious 
diseases; maternal and peri-natal conditions; micronutrient deficiencies; and 
tobacco-related illness. The key phrase is "avoidable deaths" and herein lies the 
problem: In what practical sense are these avoidable when their eradication (or 
reduction) requires a substantial economic investment over and above what is 
already being contributed by the affected countries? Additional foreign aid could 
perhaps go some way towards alleviating these resource constraints but it is 
unlikely that aid alone would be able to fund all of the necessary programmes in 
all of the needful countries. Decisions will need to be made: which countries 
warrant the investment and which programmes \vithin those countries? 
The question of "which programmes within those countries" raises a particular 
dimension of project evaluation. Between the developed and less developed 
world, resource constraints may differ but so too do health care priorities. For 
example: I-IIV is an impending health care catastrophe in South Africa (where 
prevalence among adults 15-49 stood at around 20%90;91 at the end of 2001) in 
Botswana (where prevalence among adults 15-49 stood at 38.8%90;91 at the end of 
2001) and in a host of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in 
countries such as the USA, UK and Germany, prevalence levels among adults 15-











Figure One: Global HIV Prevalence90 
Figure Two over the page illustrates two key areas of difference between health 
care planning and delivery in the developed versus less developed contexts. The 
ftrst is the difference in resource constraints and the second is the difference in 
health care priorities. For example, not only is the GDP of South Africa less than 
the GDP of the United States87, but health spending comprises a smaller 
percentage of GDP in South Africa than it does in the US68. Similarly, the 
prevalence ofHIV in the United States is very different to the prevalence of HI V 
in South Africa90 - suggesting different health care priorities between the two 
countries. Any methodology intended to measure the effectiveness of health care 
planning and delivery in a less-developed country needs to be able to take 
account of these differences. The question that will be asked of each 











the consideration of context-specific variation in resource constraints and health 
care priorities, either in the inputs or the findings?" 
Figure Two: Assessing the methodology's capacity to consider context-specific variation in 
resource constraints and health priorities. 
Does the technique take 









Does the technique mire 
account of differing health care 
priorities? 
The two dimensions of the grid in Figure Two are deliberately constructed as 
interdependent. This interdependence was illustrated above by WHO's list of 
illnesses causing "avoidable deaths". The deaths are avoidable in the absence (or 
relaxation) of resource constraints, and the list consists largely of illnesses one 
would not expect to find in wealthier countries (TB is a particular example here). 
Hence resource constraints can drive the variation in health priorities between 
"rich" and "poor" countries. However, they are certainly not the only driver, for 
instance the prevalence of malaria (and malaria-related deaths) could be 
considered to be environmental as well as resource driven. 1ne qualitative 
framework 1ll Figure Two will be used throughout this paper to assess the 












SELECTING A METHODOLOGY 
One of the first steps in conducting an economic evaluation is to understand the 
nature of the question or problem at hand. Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) , 
cost benefit analysis CCBA) , cost minimisation (Ov1) and cost utility analysis 
(CUA) all require some valuation cost and some valuation of benefit. The 
primary point of divergence between the methods is in the way that benefit is 
measured. Cost minimisation holds the benefit constant between two 
interventions and simply attempts to minimise costS.4S;82 In cost effectiveness 
analysis, benefit is measured in terms of a specific health outcome - for example 
the number of malaria cases prevented or the number of diarrhoeal infections 
d 34'60'70'81 I tili· al' th f b fi" f cure . ' " n cost u ty an YS1S, e measurement 0 ene t is 1n tenus 0 
utility as captured by a disability-adjusted life year CDAL y), a quality adjusted life 
year (QAL Y) or a healthy life year equivalent (HYE).20;82 Cost benefit analysis, 
often considered the gold standard of economic evaluation, measures the net 
monetised benefit to a society (or group within a society) of an intervention.15;91 
Cost benefit analysis is the only methodology that appears to be entirely 
consistent with textbook welfare economics.91 ;15;20;4O;88 
This consistency with economic welfare theory presents a further dimension for 
the assessment of economic evaluation of health care. To what degree are these 
methods based on first-principles economic theory? And to what degree does 
that theoretical foundation translate into practice? It is necessary to distinguish 
between the theory and the practice because the move from theory to practice 
could be more difficult in the developing country context and certainly fraught 
with challenges. The limited availability of data on health care utilisation 
(from the patient's perspective) and the cost health care delivery (from the 
provider's perspective) are just two examples of how the practical application of 
economic theory might be complicated in the developing country context. Figure 











context-specific dimension illustrated in Figllre Two. Again, the dimensions of the 
theoretic "matrix" are deliberately constructed as interdependent criteria. The 
closer a methodology moves to the centre of the diagram, the better the 
methodology fares on all criteria. 
Figllre Three: A matrix for the assessment of the economic evalllation of health care 
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Before initiating the critical assessment proposed, it is necessary to establish what 
the terms "welfare economics" or "fIrst-principles economic foundations" mean. 
The assessment matrix outlined in Figure Three, will then serve as a framework to 












Chapter Two: The Theoretical Foundations oj 
Health Costing 
THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF HEALTH COSTING 
At the core of welfare economics is the familiar problem of utility maximisation 
d . 77,78,86-91 I . 11 d th . b h un er constramt. ' ,. t is genera y assume at econoffilc actors eave 
rationally and that preferences are revealed through actions of the 
individual. 17;77;91;94 This enables the State, as the likely coordinator of public 
welfare, to maximise the utility of society as a whole through the optimisation of 
an appropriate social welfare function. 86;91;93;94 This is theoretically achievable 
through the use of the Pareto rule for welfare improvements i.e. if you can make 
one member of society better off without making anyone else in society worse 
off, then you have achieved a Pareto welfare improvement.17;43;91;94 If no such 
improvements are possible the society has achieved a state of Pareto 
optimality. 
A health economist is likely to find fault with the application of this premise for a 
number of reasons. Firsdy, is this the role that the State should be playing? 78;91 
Secondly, how do we really know the implications of a health intervention at the 
margin?I;20;78;91 Thirdly, the theory supposes that individual's preferences are 
revealed through the exercise choice. 17;91;94 In many markets, preferences 
cannot be revealed because of institutional failure, market failure or a lack of 
individual capacity. Can an unborn child reveal a preference for his HIV positive 
mother to received anti-retrovttal treatment? 
Finally, the existence of a single global maximum - i.e. a single optimal solution to 
a maximisation problem - requires strict convexity of the utility function. In 
many other markets this does not pose a problem, as the law of diminishing 











However, in the case of many medical interventions, the law of diminishing 
marginal returns does not always hold. Consider a patient on chronic asthma 
medication. As long as the patient continues to take the medication he or she will 
enjoy good health. The body does not build up a resistance to the medicine over 
time nor does it display any adverse side effects. Failure to take the medication 
will result in dis utility - dizziness, shortness of breath and possibly even death. 
This case describes constant rather than diminishing marginal utility. The 
solution to an optimisation problem such as this will not yield a single global 
maximum. From a public health perspective, another source of non-convexity is 
the existence of externalities such as those which arise when an epidemic is 
controlled through inoculation. 
In their seminal paper, Lipsey and Lancaster46;91 address the problem of reaching 
an optimal solution in a world where the theoretical assumptions of standard 
welfare economics do not apply. They coined the phrase "the second best 
world" when referring to the world outside of the optimal solution. This paper, 
and indeed this problem in general, has sparked a wealth of literature on the 
subject, some of which has important implications for the economic evaluation 











HOW CAN THE THEORY OF THE SECOND BEST AID ECONOMIC 
EVALUATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
According to Lipsey and Lancaster (1956),46;91 the "General Theorem of the 
Second Best" states that if a constraint is introduced into a general equilibrium 
system that prevents attainment of one of the Paretian conditionst, then the 
other Paretian conditions (which may srill be attainable), are no longer necessarily 
desirable. 
Real markets are seldom likely to satisfy all of the conditions for Pareto 
optimality. If Pareto optimality is both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
welfare maximization, what is a sufficient condition for at least a welfare 
improvement when a market or society 1S not at the maximumt6;91 What 
solutions can economic theory provide? 
There appear to be two primary schools of thought regarding Lipsey and 
Lancaster's article. One interpretation is concerned with idea that outside of 
Pareto Optimal equilibrium, we can say nothing positively about optimal resource 
allocation. 16;91 The second school of thought insists that economic theory can srill 
be of some assistance to the decision-maker by drawing on measurement of 
d d . h 1 1686·91 ea we1g toss. ' , Each of these views obviously has quite different 
implications for policy design. 
t These conditions require: perfect competition in all sectors of the economy so !hat marginal cost will 
necessarily equal price; there should be no external economies or diseconomies of scale; there should be 











MAKING THE BEST OF A SECOND BEST SITUATION IN THEORY 
Davis and \Vhinston16 pursued the idea of using normative decision rules by 
defining a Pareto optimum problem as one in which all normative behavioural 
rules can be determined so that the solutions of the system achieve a vector 
maximum i.e. a set of possible maxima rather than a single global maximum. 
They define a second best problem as one in which at least one of the normative 
behavioural rules is non-trivially specified, cannot be changed, and in which any 
deviation from that rule cannot be altered by policy. The remainder of the 
normative behavioural rules are to be chosen so as to achieve a vector maximum. 
Arriving at this new set of decision rules remains a problem, which Davis and 
\Vhinston do not address adequately. To this end, Stiglitz86 invokes the idea of 
deadweight loss as an objective economic criterion to choose between two 
second best allocations (and their accompanying normative decision rules). 
Stiglitz argues that second best theory tells us only that we cannot blindly apply 
the lessons of first best economics. accepts that choosing a course of action 
when distortions exist is often difficult. However, he argues that economic 
theory can tell us when two smaller distortions are preferable to one large one; 
and when it is better to have inefficiencies in both consumption and production 
. d' al 86 or ill pro uc110n one. 
Stiglitz86 thus proposes that while informational requirements are extensive, 
variables such as income, expenditure and price can give some assistance to the 
decision maker. 
THE POSITIVE VERSUS NORMATIVE TRADE-OFF IN PRACTICE 
Lipsey and Lancaster propose that is no single necessary, sufficient 











number of second best options but, according to Lipsey and Lancaster, economic 
theory can do little more than shift society from one second best option to 
another. The negative corollary to the "General Theory of the Second Best" 
specifically states that there is no a priori way to judge between various situations 
in which some of the Pareto optimum conditions are fulfilled while others are 
not.46 If partial equilibrium analysis can present us with a number of second best 
options yet cannot assist us in choosing between these options, how then do we 
decide on the direction that policy recommendations should take? 
If we rely on government officials to make policy decisions, what factors ensure 
that they act in the general interest? Faith and Thompson22;22 and Brownll ;l1 
believe that the theory of the second best may assist in explaining observed 
one government policy. If there is no other (positive) criterion for ;;,pl,pornl ... 
second best option over another, they may be likely to follow their own 
interest as a policy maker, politician or bureaucrat?11;22;91 However, in a truly 
democratic environment, the risk of being voted out of power is a credible threat. 
As such, a politician may (out of a sense of self-preservation) choose to act in the 
interests of his or her constituency. In a less democratic world the outcome may 
be driven by a desire for self-enrichment on the part of the decision maker, 
unchecked by any credible threat of sanction. The decision maker would be 
ma:x:imising his or her own individual utility function rather than the social 
welfare function of the community they serve. 
This suggests that there may be ways to contain the extent of self-interested 
behaviour among those planning and implementing health policy. Social and 
political institutions could potentially be structured to provide a credible threat of 
sanction. In addition, income and expenditure data (for example)86 could provide 
a transparent and positive measurement framework for the evaluation of 











ambit of paper but the interested reader is referred most particularly to 
Stiglitz, (2000).86 
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE THEORY OF THE SECOND 
BEST 
Policy design within the world of the second best is a more complicated task than 
that in the clearly defined Pareto optimal world.86 However, partial equilibrium 
analysis can identify potential second best outcomes,46;91 and knowledge of the 
relevant social welfare function(s) can be gleaned from observable cues such as 
income data, expenditure data, pricing data and other behavioural measures 
(including survey data and political polls in some cases).86;91 This knowledge of 
the options, along with society's priorities, can be combined \vith an analysis of 
likely deadweight 105586;91 to arrive at an efficient and equitable outcome. 
W'hether or not that allocation is optimal, remains a matter of subjective 
.. 46'91 opl111on. ' 
the challenge to cost minimisation; cost benefit; cost utility and cost 
effectiveness analysis, is to optimise in a first-best world and satisfice the world 
of the second best. Let us now consider how effectively each method is likely to 











Chapter Three: Cost Minimisation 
Too I 
A Rarely Used 
COST MINIMISATION AND OUTPUT MAXIMISATION 
'Ine basic premise of cost minitnisation (or its converse, output maximisation) is 
that, given two health interventions with equal efficacy, the lower cost 
intervention should be chosen48;82. For example, take the hypothetical case of 
skin cancer (or melanoma) where a cream or very minor surgery are equally 
effective at removcing the affected cells. If the cream costs less than the surgical 
procedure, then cost rninitnisation would advocate the cream. As health is kept 
constant and only spending is minimised, this has little to do with allocative 
efficiency ill a strict sense. For the purposes of this discussion, allocative 
efficiency is defined as the allocation of resources across different health 
interventions so as to maximise the health of a given population60;91. However, if 
one considers that selecting a lower cost intervention frees up resources for other 
interventions, cost rninitnisation does have allocative repercussions in the 
secondary analysis. \\1hen moving from an effective medicine of cost "x" to an 
equally effective intervention of cost "x - a" (where "a" is a positive integer) a 
Pareto improvement is realised. 
COST MINIMISATION APPLIED IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
CONTEXT 
Few traditional cost rninitnisation (CM) studies have been conducted as health 
interventions rarely have equal efficacy. However, a recent paper by Mahmud 
Khan 1ft afS uses a more advanced application of the cost rninitnisation 











facilities in Bangladesh. This appears to be the most sophisticated CM analysis 
recently conducted in a developing country context, hence its use here as an 
illustration of what CM can (and cannot) measure. 
I\1ahmud et als' 48 model attempts only to reduce the high maternal mortality rates 
(MMR) in Bangladesh and takes no account of maternal morbidity. The 
hypothesis is that the availability of emergency obstetric care (EOC) is the most 
effective strategy to reduce maternal mortality and the provision of EOC 
services necessitates the construction of a number of health care facilities. 
The cost function being minimised is a social cost function that consists of two 
parts; 
1. The cost of delivery from the provider's perspective (both fixed and 
variable); and 
2. The cost to the household. 
The cost to the household also consists of two components, namely; 
1. The cost of accessing the facility (such as transport costs and the 
opportunity cost of time); and 
2. The cost of a lack of access. It is assumed that a lack of access will 
result in avoidable deaths in some proportion of 
of life is given an economic value. 
cases and this loss 
Furthermore, the model assumes that EOC services are provided free of charge 
to the patient and that the distance to a health centre is the primary factor 
determining health care utilisation. It is suggested that the distance-decay factor 
utilised goes some way towards capturing the many social, cultural and economic 
factors affecting the health care seeking behaviour of women. Although this 











The costs to the women ('X1e) are assumed to be an increasing function of the 
radius around the health care facility (i.e. the further they are likely to be situated 
from the facility, the greater the cost). Conversely, the health costs of the 
national provider (HJ are assumed to be a decreasing function of the radius 
around the health centre because the larger the radius served by anyone centre, 
the fewer health centres are needed to cover the total geographic area of 
Bangladesh. Conceptually then, the problem looks as follows where Se represents 




Source: page 26(j48 Radius of the "catchment area 
The health centre costs (or the provider costs) were measured using the following 
fixed cost specification: 
C f = annualised cost of construction of the facility + annualised cost of EOC 
equipment + maintenance costs + personnel costs+ 
t It was assumed that personnel costs did not vary according to the number of medical cases because a certain 












The variable costs to the provider were assumed to be the costs of managing a 
case at the health centre. As the nature of pregnancy complications varies, so do 
their associated costs. As such, the average variable cost was derived by 
calculating a weighted average of the costs of treating various categories of 
complications. 
The costs to the household were slighdy more complex to calculate. Table One 
lists the parameter values used to estimate the cost to the household of accessing 
the EOC facility. 
Table One 
PARAMETER VALUE USED SOURCE OF THE DATA 
Fraction of pregnancies at risk (a) 0.20 UNICEF 
Probability that a high risk patient will use 0.70 Tertiary hospital data 
the facility (D) 
Fixed cost of transportation (a) Tk.4.00 Qualitative survey 
Variable cost of transportation (b) Tk.2.00 Qualitative survey 
Wage rate per hour (w) Tk.l0 BBS Yearbook, 1997 
Hours needed to travellkm (h) 0.5 hours Qualitative survey 
Death rate among high risk patients if EOC 1.5% ICDDR,B 
used (AHl!) 
Death rate among high risk patients if EOC 3.0% Assumed value 
not used (AHN) 
Death rate among low risk patients if EOC 0.025% Assumed value 
used (ALl!) 
Death rate among low risk patients if EOC 0.05% Derived parameter 
not used (AL N) 
GNP per capita in Bangladesh $220 World Bank Report, 1996 
Years of life lost due to pregnancy related 35 years BBS Year Book, 1996 
deaths 
Construction cost per square metre Tk.665 Ministry of Works (GOB) 
Discount rate 5% 
Utilization function fer) = 0.2-O.00Sr 











As mentioned before, the model also considers the cost of a lack of access to 
Eoe To revisit this point; it is assumed that lack of access will result 
avoidable deaths in some proportion of the cases and this loss of life is given an 
economic value. The economic value of life lost is calculated in tbis model by 
assuming that the GNP per capita measures the economic benefit of each year of 
life. As such, the economic value of life is represented by the discounted future 
income of the individual if premature death were averted. 
In short then, the cost of maternal mortality was calculated as follows: 
• Each death was assumed to result in a loss of income of US$220 
per year. 
• It was assumed that the average age at wbich maternal mortality 
occurs is 30 and that life expectancy is 65, resulting a loss of 35 
years of life. 
• The future income stream was discounted at a rate of 5% per 
annum. 
Table Two shows how the findings of the model were presented one area in 
Bangladesh. For that area the optimal radius was found to be 6 km however, the 
model was able to inform national planning as follows: 
"For most districts in Bangladesh, the minimum average cost per case occurs 
when the catchment area radius of a health facility providing is about 
10km .. .ifthe optimum radius is 10km, the [optima!) catchment area of a 
centre in the distnet should be IIi Olj 314 km2 (3. 14*1ff}. The catchment 
area is then used to calculate the total number of facilities needed to cover the 
whole population in a district. Adding the number of facilities needed in all 
the 20 districts lives us the total number of EOC facilities recommended for 












Radius Utilization Travel And Medical Annualised Cost Due 
(R) (U) Per Opportunity Care Capital To Death 
Centre Per Costs Per Costs Per Cost Per Associated 
Month Health Case Centre With A 
(No. Of Centre Managed Centre 
Women) 
2 5 198 1111 60539 23156 
4 19 1207 1111 60539 93611 
6 39 3573 1111 75673 ~ _.~128t3. 
8 64 7606 1111 105942 382331 
10 92 13424 1111 121077 603553 
12 123 20937 1111 181615 877 988 
14 154 29856 1111 196750 1207116 
16 184 39690 1111 227019 1 592414 
18 198 49724 1111 251235 2035360 
20 223 59116 1111 272424 2537434 
22 243 66709 1111 287558 3100115 
Source: page 27() 18 

















Some obvious criticisms of the cost minimisation model as it is applied in this 
example include the use of a human capital approach to the valuation of life (the 
problems with this approach will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six). The 
authors do point out however, that the model can accommodate alternative 
measures of human value, as long as an economic value of life of some kind is 
included.48;91 
A second criticism arises from the life expectancy assumption, which appears to 











demerits of various life expectancy approaches will be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter). The authors do not explicitly address this problem. 
Finally, the authors acknowledge that the model fails to take morbidity factors 
into account They acknowledge that this will affect the findings of the model by 
reducing the optimal size of 
catchment area) to some degree. 
radius (and hence optimal size of the 
A less obvious problem with this model stems from its first-principles (welfare 
economic) foundation, or its lack thereof. The model is relevant to the context 
of maternal mortality only. However, building new facilities may well require an 
increase in the health budget or, at the very least, a restructuring of the health 
budget. Where will the additional funds be taken from and at what "cost"? 
These broader allocative implications are not accounted for in the model. 
A FINAL WORD ON COST MINIMISATION 
Despite these criticisms, Mahmud Kahn et al 48 prove that the cost minimisation 
methodology can be useful for at least loosely informing policy planning, 
although it could be argued that cost effectiveness analysis might have informed 
this decision in much the same war. Mahmud Khan et alhave ensured that their 
model can be applied contexts outside of Bangladesh and, with some 
adjustment, it is possible that it could be used to inform other (similar) problems 
while taking into account the criticisms levelled above. 
The shortcomings detailed above place cost minimisation ill the following 
positions on the assessment matrix detailed earlier (see Figure Three). Cost 
minimisation fares moderately well in terms of context-specific variation as it has 
been shown to have some value in the developing country context. However, as 











far as context-specific variation is concerned, cost minimisation fails to account 
for morbidity factors and to explicitly consider possible differences in health 
priorities. Maternal mortality is assumed to be a significant health problem in 
Bangladesh because the maternal mortality ratio fares unfavourably with more 
developed countries. However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that maternal mortality should be Bangladesh's most urgent health care priority. 
The cost minimisation exercise detailed above sheds no light on this issue. 
As discussed, cost minimisation fares relatively poorly in terms of its theoretical 
foundation, primarily because it takes little account of the allocative implications 
of health spending. It must be emphasised that the position of a methodology on 
the comparative matrix is the result of a gualitative assessment only which is, of 
necessity, a conceptual and hence a subjective framework. The specific co-
ordinates on the matrix are somewhat arbitrary. 
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Chapter Four: Cost Effectiveness Analysis An 
I n a d e qua t eRe fie c t ion of Soc i a I We' far e Ide 0 logy 
INTRODUCTION 
Although for reasons of clarity, cost effectiveness is clearly differentiated from 
cost benefit and cost utility analysis in this paper, there is some overlap in their 
in practice. Cost utility analysis is often considered to be a form of cost 
effectiveness analysis that enables one to arrive at a cost per util measure rather 
than a cost per unit of health output (e.g. life year saved, cases cured etc). 
for the purposes of this discussion, a strict analytical separation will be 
maintained. 
Typically, cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) describes a health intervention in 
terms of marginal cost over marginal benefit. In practical terms this amounts to 
the measurement of incremental costs over incremental health benefits.25-27;91 
These ratios of relative cost effectiveness are then used as a way to rank the 
technical efficiency of alternative medical interventions. Given that different 
interventions often have very different health outcomes, this generalisation is 
usually accomplished by reducing the output to a common denominator such as 
li£ d **'4"91 C' / 15·91 • th e years save . ' -, urne of a ' clte e as the promoted method for 
identifying: 
• The least cost way of achieving a given output, or 
• \X!hether the same level of output could be achieved with fewer inputs; or 
• The optimal way to spend a given budget. 
n Cost utility analysis adjusts these life years saved. The merits of this adjustment will be discussed in more 











THE APPARENT SOCIAL WELFARE FOUNDATION 
Despite the frequent use of CEA for economic evaluations of health 
, ,9'34;38'414"70'71'81"106 th db' 'fi ' r th lntervennons, ' "-"', ere oes not appear to e any Jusn canon lor e 
methodology on the grounds of first principles welfare economics , 15;25;91 Both 
Garber and Phelps26 and Currie et a1 15;91 contest the use of cost effectiveness 
analysis on social welfare grounds, The core of each of their arguments is that 
the first principles foundation of CEA is sound when the analysis is taking place 
on the individual level but not when it is taking place at the societal level. On an 
individual level there are few allocative implications of health spending. Those 
allocative implications that exist can be captured by the individual's utility 
function. However, on the societal level, inter- and intra-budgetary health 
spending has allocative implications poorly captured by the CEA methodology. 
This will be illustrated shortly using an example.26;91 
Why is the CEA used so often if it has such dubious theoretical foundations? 
Garber and Phelps attribute the popularity of the CEA to the familiar ring of the 
CEA problem: 
" ... (minimising the cost rf producing a given level rf health, or 
comspondingfy, maximising the achievable level rf health for a given budget) 
sounds like a familiar economic problem, and for the most part, practitioners 
have assumed that analYsis could be a tool for utility maximisation ... " 
page 126 
Currie et al take a similar line, pointing out that the theoretical foundation of CEA 
lies in generally accepted production theory where the point of tangency between 











Despite this general application of the CEA methodology in the health care 
context, Garber and Phelps26;91 point to three problems raised by the literature. 
The first is whether CEA should include future medical costs incurred solely 
because of the prolonged period of life. The second is whether the use of life 
years as a health outcome results in discrimination against older persons. The 
third relates to the identification of an accepted cost effective cut-off ratio; how 
effective is cost effective? 
"Although one might conclude that equalitfltion 0/ cost-iffectiveness ratios at 
the margin is necessary for Pareto optimality, there is still the question 0/ the 
proper level" page 
The problem of discrimination is dealt with in considerable detail in Chapter 
Five. However, the simple Garber and Phelps,26;91 model of cost effectiveness 
explained below, illustrates many of the salient points regarding the welfare 
economic foundations of CEA. The model also addresses the derivation of an 
appropriate cut-off ratio. 
THE INDIVIDUAL CASE: A SOUND "FIRST PRINCIPLES" 
FOUNDATION 
Garber and Phelps26;91 set up the following simple three period model in which 
the individual has a Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function. For 
each period, utility is a function of income net of medical care expenditures and 
all individuals are alive in period 1. The only relevant choice variable is medical 
care expenditure in period 1 as medical care expenditure in period 2 is assumed to 











• 1';: Individual income in period i 
• Cj : Medical care expenditures in period i 
• P;: The probability of surviving from one period to the next (assuming 
~ 1) 
• U j : Individual utility in each period 
While equation one will give us an individual's expected utility a choice of 
medical care "consumption" in period one, it is also possible to use this 
framework to solve for the individual's optimal investment 111 C2 by 
differentiating consumption in Cj by the probability of surviving to P2 given 
that the effectiveness of the intervention in this model is the increase in the 
probability of surviving from one period to the next. Garber and Phelps 
structure this optimisation problem as follows: 
They conclude from the above optimal incremental CE ratio, that an optimum is 
reached when the CE ratio equals the sum of future expected utility (normalised 
by the marginal utility of income in period 1 as denoted by U;). In the individual 
context, this does go some way towards defining an optimal ratio for medical 
resource decisions by using the principles of expected utility maximisation 
principles. 
Equation two fails to address the question of unrelated future medical costs i.e. 













incurred because the individual lives longer. Garber and Phelps26;91 attempt to 
redress this by defining a total lifetime medical cost function as: 
From this definition one can see fairly easily that: 
Thus the optimal cut-off is the same as before -with the addition of period-2 
medical expenditure (or costs). This returns us to the issue of normative decision 
rules discussed earlier. Garber and Phelps recommend that the analyst practises 
consistency by selecting the CE cut-off that corresponds to the chosen cost 
accounting method. However, they don't into detail about the possible choice 
of cost accounting method or how the CE ratio should correspond. 
Garber and Phelps also recommend that the dictates of parsimony and the 
difficulty in measuring future health expenditures, could serve to justify omitting 
them. However this very difficulty in measurement makes it impossible to 
measure accurately the impact of the omission. There does not appear to be any 
published literature that deals -with this issue in any detail and this measurement 
challenge may well be the reason for the dearth. 
If one is drawing on the first principles foundation discussed earlier, analysts 
should be seeking to equate the marginal benefits and costs of all inputs. This is 
exactly what Garber and Phelps26;91 recommend that: "one should atijust the intensifY 
0/ all medical interventions so that thry have a common CE ratio" (page 9). This consistent 














THE SOCIETAL CASE: A "FIRST PRINCIPLES" IMPOSTER 
'The variability oj the optimal CE ratio a~TOss persons leads to a 
fundamental tension in using it to guide the allocation oj health care resources: 
insurers and polity makers mqy wish to equate CE ratios across interventions 
and a~ss populations, yet the members oj the population mqy have very 
different optimal CE ratios .... CE analysis applied at the population level 
mqy give the most ifftcient egalitarian distribution oj health resources, but it is 
not likejy to be Pareto optimal. "page 2rj6 
Garber and Phelps reach a conclusion which has considerable implications for 
the planning of public health provision; namely, that the optimal ratio is most 
sensitive to two individual characteristics: income and risk aversion. 
As these characteristics differ considerably from individual to individual- how is 
the government planner expected to optimise health allocations in a culturally, 
economically and socially heterogeneous society? In a country where the gap 
between the very wealthy and the very poor is wide, can one simply take a mean 
income level and some mean measure of risk aversion and apply it to the total 
populace? 
Currie et at 15;91 propose that the societal approach to cost effectiveness 
contradicts the textbook idea of CEA. They use an example that takes into 
account the patients' costs of an intervention e.g. transport to the clinic. They 
show that this can result in the selection of an intervention that is most cost 
effective from a patient perspective. However if an alternate intervention is more 
cost effective from a pure provider perspective, then one must consider the 
opportunity cost of those provider funds "wasted" on the less cost-effective 
intervention. Those funds could (in theory) have been allocated to other patients 











Cost effective analysis is most pertinent when alternate programme designs are 
being compared. In fact the cost effectiveness measure was developed to enable 
policy makers to select a bundle of cost effective health interventions. This is 
done by selecting those ratios with the lowest cost per life year saved.6Q;91 
However, as the quote below suggests, by simply comparing cost effectiveness 
ratios no credence is given to affordability or absolute effectiveness. 
"It is not possible with cost-ifftctivcness ana!Jsis to determine whether a 
treatment is prifitable for society or not. Cost-ifftctiveness ana!Jsis provides a 
direct answer on!J if the alternative with the best ifftct has the lowest cost 
ifftctiveness ratio. Jj one alternative has a higher cost-ifftctiveness ratio than 
another but offers better ifjects, the choice between these alternatives cannot be 
made simplY on the basis of cost-ifftctiveness ana!Jsis, but some decision 
criterion has to be introduced. "pg 640 
A recent paper measuring the cost effectiveness of highly active anti-retroviral 
therapy (HAART) for HIV positive patients in South Africa estimated the cost 
per life year saved to be between RS,600 and RS,700 (approximately).10;42 This is 
more cost effective than kidney dialysis, chemotherapy, coronary by-pass surgery 
and a number of other interventions offered by the South African public health 
service. Despite this, HAART is not currently offered in the public health sector. 
One of the factors that may well be giving policy-makers pause is the prevalence 
rate of the disease in South Africa. Far more patients are likely to apply for 
HAART than for chemotherapy potentially resulting in a higher total cost of 
delivery6. This higher total cost might have significant allocative implications, 
which are not addressed in the cost effectiveness framework despite their 
particular importance in the economically disparate society of South Africa. 
6 Boulle et I1l'1Oestimated that the total program costs for 2007 would be around R300 million. This assumed 











Currie et al argue that, "there is no role for a societal approach to (page 1 YS;91 
because the societal approach raises allocative issues which the CEA 
methodology is ill-equipped to measure. Boyle et al (as referenced in Currie et a~ 
make the point that a CEA which takes a societal approach, should take into 
account all the associated costs and benefits of an intervention, regardless of 
where their benefit or burden may fall. Currie et al take this definition to include 
costs and benefits that may fall outside the context of health services (and the 
health budget) and they point to the significant distributional issues that this 
broader perspective necessarily raises. Of course, these shortcomings assume 
that CElli is applied mechanically without any political and/or social 
consideration of the use of the findings or indeed, the initial definition of the 
problem and the budget available for its solution. 
Currie et ailS suggest that cost effectiveness calculations are often done when cost 
benefit calculations are a more appropriate cost measure. Cost benefit analysis is 
a technique employed in identifying, quantifying and valuing - in a common 
yardstick such as money - all important costs and consequences to society of any 
potential or actual change in resource use allocation in the economy. As such, 
cost benefit analysis should (in theory) enable the policy maker to take into 
account the value of the forgone treatments. 
AN ADDITIONAL CRITICISM OF THE CEA METHODOLOGY 
Garber and Phelps26 cite a wealth of literature that identifies the interaction of 












(~ .. at higher degrees qf risk aversion, the optimal ratio shifts more with 
age, and as people become less risk averse, age has a diminishing (and finallY 
nearlY zero) iffed on the optimal CE ratio "page 26_2726• 
Murray58;91 makes the point that adding years to life does not have the same 
meaning at all stages of life. For example, adding years to life when one is a child 
means adding active years of learning and growth, however, as Murray points out, 
adding years to the latter stages of life may add very litde in terms of life quality. 
It is this difference in life quality (which is not only determined by age!) that the 
conventional CEA. fails to capture. Garber and Phelps see this as a key failing 
and they argue that by omitting the effects of an intervention on future quality of 
life, particular treatments are likely to be undervalued (here they cite the example 
of rehabilitative care). 
thinking has led to the practise of quality adjusting life years to capture the 
burden of disease when that burden does not necessarily result in death. The 
critical assessment of practise \"ill be done as part of a broader discussion on 
Cost Utility Analysis (CUA) in the next Chapter. 
A FINAL WORD ON COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
((Resource allocation decisions can never be shaped I?J the mechanical ranking 
rf cost -iffectiveness ratios. Ratios provide itiformation about one type qf 
({valueJ~ health benl!ftt per dollar spent. But other types qf values qf socie(y, 
including considerations rf distributive justice and fairness .. . require that 
CELl be viewed as an itifOrmer rf decision making rather than a decision 
maker per se." [Gold et al (1996)11 











Conclusions, and hence policy recommendations, cannot necessarily be made by 
a simple comparison of cost-effectiveness ratios.15;21;21;91 Cost effectiveness 
measures merely succeed in giving a ranking of various interventions in terms of 
efficiency, usually measured in terms of cost per life year or cost per health 
outcome. The most cost effective option is not necessarily the cheapest option in 
terms of total costs. This variation in total costs raises a number of policy 
concerns. Firstly, cost effectiveness measures say nothing about whether the 
health budget can accommodate an intervention. Secondly, it cannot be certain 
that allocating the additional funds to an intervention that is more cost effective 
(but has a higher total cost) is in fact the best use of those funds. The 
opportunity cost of the additional funding has not been accounted for and until it 
is, any concrete policy recommendations would be ill advised in any setting. 
What this implies of course, is that many of these shortcomings could be 
overcome if the CEA were conducted in a dynamic socio-political environment 
in which issues such as budget allocations could be considered 'without the undue 
influence of special interest groups (for example). Tbis may not always be the 
case in the developing country context - hence the critical treatment of the 
in the context of this discussion. 
In the language of the formal assessment matrix, CEA fares better than cost 
minimisation (CM) in terms of both theoretical foundations and context-specific 
variation. In terms of context specific variation, Boulle et al'~ave shown that 
CEA can inform health policy by contextualising the cost of new interventions 
(such as ~,\RT) along side existing health care interventions (such as kidney 
dialysis). However, CEA is still found wanting in many respects as it serves only 
to rank health interventions without advising a cut-off point or an optimal 
program size for each intervention. Furthermore CEA says nothing about the 
interaction of various interventions (such as HAART and HIV prevention 











externalities in resource constrained emlironments. CEA does not assist with the 
setting of health priorities on any basis other than direct cost. 
On a theoretic basis, both Currie et aIlS and Garber and Phelps26 argue that CEA 
has sOlU1d economic fOlU1dations at the individual level but poor fOlU1dations at 
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Chapter Five: Cost Utility Analysis Is There a 
Way to Reflect Accurately the Utility of Health 
Care? 
WHY DO \'VE NEED A COMPOSITE INDICATOR OF BURDEN OF 
DISEASE? 
The term "burden of disease" (BoD) corrunonly refers to both morbidity and 
mortality, where morbidity is the variation from perfect health experienced by any 
ill person. In composite burden of disease measures, disability weights attempt to 
capture degrees of suffering or incapacity associated ·with different non-fatal 
conditions (or fatal conditions which are preceded by a loss of physical 
function.) 39 For example, the Quality Adjusted Life (QAL Y) sets perfect 
health equal to one and death equal to zero?6;91 The burden of disease in this 
composite measure thus varies between one and zero "UJ~<C"UJ.i~ that a QALY is 
a "good" to be maximised. Conversely, the Disability Adjusted Life Year 
(DALY) sets perfect health equal to zero and death equal to one. This results in 
similar variation between zero and one, but the DALY should be considered a 
"bad" to be minimised.3;4;91 
The arguments against measures of the burden of disease are varied and include 
concerns about the accurate measurement of the burden,37;56;91;98;99 the definition 
of the burden across settings,23;37S6;58;61;91;98;99 the incompleteness of the 
concept23;37;56;58;61;91;98;99 and the inconsistency of the concept with social welfare 
economics in its violation of (or disregard for) Arrow's impossibility theorem§§i.e. 
that one cannot sum the individual utilities to arrive at a social utility function.··· 
§§ This criticism does not appear in the current literature hut is valid none the less. 












J\furray58;59;61;91 reduces the controversy around BoD indicators to the basic 
tenants of the implicit versus explicit rationing dilemma50;51. He lists four 
objectives that any BoD indicator should aim to satisfy58;59;61;91 and cites the first 
two objectives as an indication that a BoD measure is in fact a rationing aid: 
1. To aid in setting health service priorities 
2. To aid in setting health research priorities 
3. To aid in identifying disadvantaged groups and targeting health 
interventions 
4. To provide a comparable measure of output across the forms and 
stages of an intervention 
It is Murray's58;91 belief that except for the case of completely markets, the 
allocation of resources between programmes defines a set of weights for 
different health outcomes which are likely to be assigned in a less than 
transparent manner. 
(11 the process of choosing relative weights 0/ different types of health outcomes 
is left entirelY to the political or bureaucratic process there is a high probability 
that similar health outcomes mCfY be weighted inconsistentlY . .. there mCfY be no 
open discussion or debate on kry value choices or differential weightings. " pgs 
429430 58 
benefit of a measure such as the DALY assumes then, that the political 
process of priority setting is closed and that a burden of disease indicator would 
somehow allow a more open and explicit of rationing. Wbile it is true that a 
substantial amount of digging through the literature will reward the reader with 
the components of the DALY and the assumptions inherent in its design, it is not 
true that this information is generally available or accessible, let alone easily 
understood. The arguments for and against burden of disease indicators contain 











may not be the explicit tool that Murray supposestit. Similarly, institutional (or 
political) rationing mechanisms may not be the obscure (or entirely implicit) tool 
that Murray criticises. Recommended protocols such as the "Standard Treatment 
Guidelines and Essential Drugs lists" explicitly ration doctor's treatment choices 
in South Africa.42;85 
While the implicit versus explicit rationing debate is one component of BoD 
debate it is certainly not the only component of that debate. To reduce the 
controversy to the basis for rationing is to obscure problems that arise from 
Murray's latter two objectives of the BoD indicator. These last two objectives 
speak of comparability. For an intervention (or its output) to be comparable 
across different contexts it must first be reduced to a common or generic basis. 
Proponents of the DAL y58-61;91 argue that this is a key benefit, utility is common 
to all economic agents and as such a cost per DALY measure can be compared 
across social groups within a country, as well as between countries and 
continents. A concern given less attention in the literature is that by reducing the 
BoD to satisfy this generic requirement, assumptions and value judgements must 
be made which may not in fact apply across all of these settings. 
Mooney et a1 56;91 express concern about the desire to generate a uniform measure 
of the burden of disease61 • They make the point that the burden of disease is 
likely to vary between communities and within communities. A paraplegic 
working in an office environment is likely to be less hindered by disability than a 
subsistence farmer in a rural area who needs to be able bodied in order to grow 
enough food for the family. Similarly, for a monthly wage eamer who is paid for 
"sick-leave", the burden of disease is likely to be less than for the hourly wage 
eamer who is not paid if they do not turn up. 
tIT 'Ibe following empirical example will illustrate how changes in the assumptions of the DALY can impact 
on the resulting policy recommendations. The DALY does not appear to be a standard rule of 











WHAT IS A DALym:? 
Traditional indicators of health such as life expectancy, fertility and infant, child, 
maternal and adult mortality, have largely been replaced in the health economic 
literature by composite measures of both mortality and morbidity (such as 
DALYs and QALYs). Conventional mortality figures fail to capture the effects 
of sickness and disability (morbidity) which do not result in death, and statistics 
on disease incidence can be rough at best. Furthermore, morbidity statistics are 
likely to be particularly poor in less developed countries where reporting 
mechanisms may not be functioning optimally and where a lack of access to 
medical care may prevent any formal recording of morbidity incidence. Similarly, 
as morbidity statistics are generally collected at point of treatment, few 
morbidity statistics that do exist tend to be biased towards the wealthier segment 
of the population, which can afford to seek medical care more frequently than 
poorer segments.104 The disability adjust life year (DALY) is thus a quantitative 
indicator of burden of disease (BoD) that reflects the total amount of healthy life 
lost, whether to morbidity or premature mortality.39 
As was the case with CEA, cost utility analysis (CUA) and DAL Ys were designed 
to assist in setting national and global health priorities. The principle suggestion 
of the 1993 W orId Development ReportlOO was to use CUA to select a package of 
essential health services. The line between the essential and discretionary 
interventions was to be drawn on the basis of their cost effectiveness39. 
This suggests that the DALY (or the process of minimising DALYs) can assist in 
optimising allocative efficiency. However, the extent to which one accepts this 
premise should be tempered by an understanding of how effectively the DALY 
reflects level of morbidity in a society. It should also be tempered by the fact 
m This paper focuses on the DALY as this is the composite measure of BoD recommended by the World 











that not all public spending allocations will have direct morbidity implications. 
For example, the link between education and morbidity is tenuous at best surely 
proponents of the DALY would not suggest that the entire education budget be 
reallocated to health care in order to minimise the level of morbidity in a 
population? The allocative strengths of the DALY should therefore be treated 
with caution. 
EXAMPLES OF LEADING CAUSES OF MORTALITY AND 
MORBIDITY UNDERLYING DALYS AROUND THE WORLD 
Table One103 over the page shows that HIV is the leading cause of mortality and 











Table One: Leading causes of disabiliry-acijusted life years 
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CONSTRUCTING A DALY 
The DALY calculation incorporates five 
measure the burden of disease:23;39;74;97 
"social preferences" in an attempt to 
1. The duration of time lost due to premature mortality 
2. Disability weights 
3. Age Weights 
4. Time preferences 
5. Health can be summed across individuals 
of these will now be discussed in more detail before constructing the full 
formula the DALY. 
1) The duration if time lost due to premature mortality 
As both Murray61 and Molia et al 55 point out, the measurement of health status 
using time is not a new idea. However, specifically what form this measurement 
should take seems to be the subject of some dispute. Murray,61 places the 
commonly used approaches into four distinct calegC}ne:s: 
1. The "potential" years of life lost approach: 
x=L 
Ldx(L-x) Equation 1 
x=o 
This method is calculated by defining a potential limit to life (L) and 
calculating the years lost due to age at each death as the limit less the age 
at death, where d" in the above formula is the number of deaths at age x. 
One failing of this method is that deaths occurring after the imposed 
age-limit (or limit to life "L") do not contribute to the estimated burden 
of disease. Other failing is the fact that the selection of that limit "L" can 











11. The "period" expected years of life lost approach: 
Equation 2 
In the fonnula above, ex is the expectation of life at each age. This 
method uses the local life expectancy as the estimate of duration of life 
lost at each age and may be considered to be more accurate as it estimates 
the stream of life within a particular context of risk of death from various 
causes. One problem v;.1.th this method is that the differing values of life 
expectancy would lead to the conclusion that the death of a 40 year old 
woman in Soweto contributes less to the global burden of disease than 
the death of a 40 year old woman in the London because the expectation 
of life at age 40 is lower in South Africa than it is in the United 
Kingdom. 61 
ill. The "cohort" expected years of life lost approach: 
Equation 3 
x=o 
In the above equation, e~ is the life expectancy of a cohort at each age. 
This cohort life expectancy must be estimated as one cannot know the 
mortality experience of a cohort in the future. The key drawback of this 
method is that, like the period approach, cohort life expectancy will differ 












IV. The "standard" expected years of life lost approach: 
Equation 4 
This is the approach used for the calculation of DALYs where e: in the above 
expression is the expectation of life at each age based on some ideal standard.61 
The duration of time lost to death at each age is calculated by deducting the age at 
death from the ideal life expectancy of the individual. The ideal life expectancy 
used in the DALY matches the highest internationally observed life expectancy, 
which is that of Japanese women (82 years). This corresponds closest to Brass' 
West model life table, level 26, which has a life expectancy at birth for females of 
82.5 and a life expectancy at birth for men of 80 years.39 
Murray describes the task of constructing a BoD measure as taking "an n-
dimensional matrix !if health outcomes and collapsing this into a single number" pg 43rt'. The 
subjective element of this process however, lies in deciding which variables to 
include. The DALY restricts that set of variables to those characteristics which 
are common to all communities and households, namely age and gender. 
((Variables defining subgroups such as income or education, which not all 
individuals or households can hope to belong to, are expresslY excluded .from 
consideration, "pg 4 3f4. 
Life expectancy in South Africa currently stands at approximately 47.8 years.101 
However, while reducing the life expectancy in the DALY to this figure might 
more accurately reflect the burden of disease in South Africa, it would also bias 
against treatments in developing countries as they would loose fewer life years 
due to premature mortality. 
Another problem with this calculation is the relationship between BoD and life 











a key role in reducing the life expectancy of the average South African. This 
creates something of a multi-collinearity problem as life expectancy is a variable in 
the BoD composite measure, but the BoD experienced can affect one's life 
expectancy. If one assumes then that the life expectancy observed in Japan 
reflects the best health one can hope to enjoy then we do go some way towards 
remmring the effects of health on duration of life. However, the troubling fact is 
that health is not the only determinant of life expectancy. Life-style, cultural 
norms, income and other factors result in different life expectancies for different 
countries and for different social groups within countries. 
The trade off then is as follows: to have a measure that can be compared across 
social groups and across countries but which less than accurately reflects the 
burden of disease in each of those settings individually; or to have a measure 
which accurately reflects the burden of disease in homogenous groups, but which 
cannot be used to compare the effectiveness of measures across social or cultural 
contexts. 
2) Disability weights 
It is Murray's61 belief that any health outcome that represents a loss of social 
welfare should be included in an indicator of BoD, if society concerned is 
willing to devote some resources to avert or treat it. Murray clearly points out 
however, that in mentioning social welfare he is not touting the DALY as the 
best measure of the health component of social welfare nor arguing that 
maximising DALY s averted by an intervention amounts to maximising social 
welfare. 
Mooney et al 56;91 also point out that the existing concept of burden of disease 
(BoD) is incomplete as it only measures the negative impact of illness. For 
example, it does not measure the positive impact of believing that your country 











positive externality is not captured by current BoD measures. Mooney56;91 
suggests that were these positive externalities to be captured, more resources 
might be allocated to the aboriginal people of Australia than are currently 
allocated. Thus the current concept of "burden" can lead to bias in the allocation 
of resources. 
\X7hile disability weights are an interesting measure in their own right, they are 
highly context specific and sensitive to societal bias.65;91 BoD should thus be 
avoided as a tool for policy setting unless it is supplement by additional analysis 
which compensates for these deficits. 
3) Age Weights 
The age weights are designed to capture the relative importance of healthy life at 
each stage of life. The weights rise until age of 25 and then decline slowly 
thereafter.39 The age weight function is an exponential function of the following 
form: 
Age weighting function = Cxe-Px 
\Xlhere: 
• Cis a constant = 0.16243 
• ~ is a constant = 0.04 
• X age 
• e is a constant 2.71 
According to Murray, the constant ~ was chosen based on consultation with an 
advisory board to generate age patterns consistent with various "surveys and 
group exercises.,,61 The constant C was chosen so that the introduction of 
unequal age weights would not change the global estimated burden of disease. 












compensated for somewhat by the insensitivity of the global burden of disease to 
the value of ~.61 
'The important issue is not the exact form qf an age-weightingfunction but 
the presence qf non-uniform weights. "pg 61 61 
Barendregt et af 7;91 contend that the range emphasised by age weighting 
system is not 9-54 as intended by Murray, but 0-27 years. This is because the 
Expected Years of Life Lost (EYLL) methodology used to calculate the DALY is 
an age-weighting system in itself that unduly compounds the formal age 
weighting. The impact of this bias will be tested in the subsequent example using 
DALYs. 
4) Time preferences 
Time preference is a component of the DALY because of the economic premise 
that individuals would rather benefit now than later. The discounting function of 
the DALY has an exponential form and the discount rate is assumed to be 
3% 39;74. 
Discounting function = e -r(x-a) 
\X'here: 
• r is the discount rate, fixed at 0.03 
• a onset of disease 
• X age 
• e is a constant::::: 2.71 
Despite the use of discounting in cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, 
there is no consensus on the conceptual justification for discounting health 












However, Murray 74 puts forward the following arguments in favour of social 
time preferences (and the resultant discounting of health benefits): 
1. Individuals may have a pure time preference due only to myopia. 
2. increased future consumption is accompanied by decreased marginal 
utility consumption, then a marginal unit of consumption in the future will 
be less than in the present and the future unit should be accordingly 
discounted. 
3. is related to uncertainty, therefore futures outcomes should be 
discounted to reflect the but positive risk that the individual will not 
exist at that time. 
4. There is a possible time paradox which arises because one could argue 
that health benefits should be discounted at a lower rate than moneta:ry costs 
and one is only indifferent to the time period when costs and benefits are 
discounted equally. 
5. If health benefits are not discounted, we might erroneously conclude that 
all resources should be invested in disease eradication plans that have finite 
costs. This might crowd out interventions that do not result in disease 
eradication but which are efficacious none the less. 
4.1) Discounting Life Expectancy and Intergenerational Equity 
Anand and Hanson6 observe that due to the 3% per annum discount rate 
advocated by Murray97,61 one life today would be worth 5 lives in 55 years time. 
This tendency to favour the current generation over future generations, weights 
treatments that offer to cure the current generation more heavily. This creates a 
bias against prevention programmes whose effects are only likely to be felt in the 












The time preference argument behind discounting is defensible even in the health 
care environment uncertainty is as likely to play a role as any other 
environment. Similarly, discounting can be defended on the grounds that any 
investment in health today is likely to yield a return in the future. However, while 
these arguments make intuitive sense, one could also see how the appreciation 
current investments in health (or the decrements of future uncertainty) is unlikely 
to be exponential. It is this reason - and from the resultant bias caused by 
exponential discounting that writers in this field are beginning to advocate 
presentation of economic evaluations both with and without discounting, as well 
as with sensitivity analysis' that test the sensitivity of findings to changes in the 
discount rateS6 
5) Health can be summed across individtmls 
The DALY calculation treats two people each losing 10 years of disability free life 
the same as one person losing 20 years. However, it is possible to weight 
duration non-linearly to give priority to fewer people suffering for long intervals.39 
6) The complete DALY formula 
The number of DALY s lost due to disability at age x can be calculated using the 












D - Disability weight ranging from 0 (perfect health) to 1 (death)§§§ 
Equation 2 must now be integrated as follows, to calculate the number of 
DALYs lost from the onset of a disability (a) to the age of death (a+L) if the 
person lives to their maximum life expectancy. 
L~a L~a J DALY(x)dx = DC Jxe-Ik-rx+radx 
x=a x~a 
and: 
1) u =x ~ du =dx 
2) 
-x({J+r) 




DC Jxe-fl~-J:x+ra dx = DCera Jxe-X({J+r) dx 
x=a 
Now Solving for I: 











I =uv fVdu 
xe-x(f3+r) e-x(/3+r) I f dx Lx __ +a
a 
I -(fJ+r) - -(fJ+r) 
-x(/3+r) 1 I L I xe + __ f e -X(/3+r) dx +a 
(fJ+r) fJ+r x=a 
I xe - (fJ + r) ( 1 J( e-x(/3+r) \j I L+a 
(fJ + r) + fJ + r - (fJ + r) x=a 
I 
e-X(/3+r) ( 1 J I L+a 
(fJ + r) x + fJ + r x=a 
e-(L+a)(/3+r) ( 1 J e-a(/3+r) 
---- L+a+ +--
fJ + r (fJ + r) fJ + r 
I 
1= L+a+ + a+--
_e-a(/3+rl e-L(/3+r) r 1 J e-a(/3+r) ( 1: 
(fJ + r) \ (fJ + r) (fJ + r) fJ + r 
1= + e-L(/3+r) L+a+ - a+--e-
a
(/3+r) [ ( 1 J ( 1 J] 
(fJ + r) (fJ + r) fJ + r 
I e- + [e- L(fJ + r)(l + (B + r)(L + a))- (1 + (fJ + r)a)] 
(fJ + 
So, 
L+a L+a f DALY(x) dx = DCera f xe-x(/3+r) dx 
x=a x=a 
=- e 2 [e-(/3+r)L(l+(fJ+ r)(L+a)-(l+(fJ+ r)a)] 
[
DC -fJa ] 
(fJ + r) 
This process of integration therefore yields the following formula.:39;91 
DALY = [(D)(Ce-: )][e-(/3+rlL(1 + (B + r)(L + a)) - (1 + (r + fJ)a)] 












DALYS AT WORIZ - THE CASE OF HIV IN SOUTH AFRICA 
HIV Treatment in the Current Political Climate 
HIV has become a highly politicised illness in South Africa, with the debate 
around mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of the disease receiving 
considerable media attention. The latter half of 2001 however, appears to have 
seen a relaxing of government's anti-treatment stance following pressure from the 
Treatment Action Campaign and COSATU89 , and constitutional court challenge 
of the "no treatment" stance. According to the :Minister of Health, between May 
2001 and January 2002; 38168 women had been tested for HIV in public ante-
natal clinics around the country. Of these, 9490 (24.9%) tested positive and 3734 
(39.3%) received Nevirapine as part of the governments roll-out of a state 
package to reduce MTCT 30. 
On the 17th of April 2002 government also agreed to offer ARV treatment to 
sexual assault survivors72. The MTCT programme and the provision of ARVs to 
sexual assault survivors are both measures that did not originally feature in the 
"HIV / AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa, 2000-2005." These 
measures have, however, been subsequendy added to the plan and they illustrate 
that the government is prepared to be flexible to some extent about the best way 
to achieve the strategic objectives laid out in the document. 
This flexibility is the motivation for the consideration of a highly active anti-
retroviral treatment (HAART) package for AIDS sufferers in South Africa. 
Declining pharmaceutical prices and simpler treatment regimens may have put a 
basic treatment package within the bounds of cost effectiveness (or cost-utility in 
this case). The reader should note however, that despite the pragmatic 
motivation for this costing, it is merely presented here as an example of the 
DALY methodology at work. The interested reader is referred to the original 











South African Medical J ournal.lO The original paper provides the detailed costing 
of a HAART prC)gr:lmme in South Africa. It accounts for mortality effects but 
not morbidity as the paper was intended as an advocacy tool. Morbidity 
effects are both more complex to calculate and to interpret and they can conceal 
more than they reveal, as the following example will show. 
Back to Basics: A Review of ARVs in the HAART Context 
In light of the media attention HIV / AIDS has received, and the well-publicised 
debate over the role of ARVs, it might be beneficial to review the generally 
accepted benefits and drawbacks of antiretroviral treatment in the HAART 
context before entering into the costing example: 
• The HIV prevalence rate in a sexually active population will not 
exceed 20 40% at the peak of the epidemic.96 
• \X'hen approximately 2% of the sexually active population is infected, 
the spread of the disease becomes exponential.96 
• From the onset of exponential infection rates, it takes approximately 
ten years for prevalence rates to peak.96 
• Once the prevalence rates have peaked, the HIV is likely to become 
endemic to the affected society, with approximately 10% of the 
sexually active population being positive at anyone rime.96 
• Antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) prolong life but do not cure the 
disease.35;105 
• ARVs reduce the viral load of the patient thus reducing the extent to 
which they are infectious.24;73 
• Despite the improved outcomes, some problems such as failure and 











• There is a growing literature concerned with drug resistance following 
HAART, which can limit therapeutic options.31;.3S;105 
The pro-HAART argument revolves around the following main ideas: 
• Access to medical care is a basic human right and ARV s have been 
show to be effective in prolonging the lives of AIDS sufferers.89;.35;105 
• IiAART can support the effectiveness of prevention campaigns.92 
The future treatment burden South Africa will inevitably face as a result of the 
HIV epidemic is beginning to emerge. Although the rate of new infections may 
have peaked, South Africa will be battling with increasing HIV morbidity for 
many years to come. While much of the public debate has thus focused on 
marginal issues such as toxicity, there has been little constructive debate between 
opposing camps on the two key issues; cost and efficacy. Where the pro-camp 
have focused on efficacy and largely ignored issues around cost, the anti-
campaign has dwelt on costs. Both are important issues and this exercise goes 
some way towards pinning down the true cost implications of a limited HAART 
program in South Africa.42 
Notwithstanding any future political decisions to mobilise extraordinary resources 
for HIV treatment, the following model provides the cost per DALY of a 
baseline national treatment programme. This example only makes use of the 











Devising a unit cost ofHAART treatment: An Overview of the 
Assumptions **** 
The following costing has been based on a service model which is currently 
emerging in the Westem Cape services in which: 
1. "HIV I AIDS services are required to develop the relationships between patients and 
clinicians, to ensure continuity oj care, and to provide a mechanism through which 
patients can be evaluated for potential enrolment onto an antiretroviral treatment 
programme. These services, whilst being part oj a range oj services qffered at primary 
health care clinics, are not a replacement for the primary health care and often constitute 
an additional service, and should be costed as such. "pg 210 
2. Consequent on meeting some form of eligibility which do not 
contravene the patient's constitutional rights to access, patients become 
eligible for HAART when they become AIDS symptomatic. This is 
generally coincides with the onset of Stage 4 of the HIV infection when 
HIV develops into AIDS.102 The baseline scenario for this exercise 
allows for CD4 count testing which would further inform the initiation of 
treatment; 10 
3. It is assumed that patients would have their HAART program managed 
through a specialised HIV IAIDS service, although they would still attend 
conventional primary health care services for other needs.lO 
"" The model has been taken from a paper by Boulle et at 10. The model was at the 4th 
fntemationa! AfDS Conference in Barcelona in July 2002 and is pending publication in the South African 











Direct programme costs 
Medicines 
Medicine costs comprise the largest proportion of HAART program costs. This 
model uses the generic drug regimes and proportions detailed in Table Three. 
Furthermore, an annual drug price reduction is assumed which, in real terms, 
amounts to 10% per year for the first three years and 5% annually thereafter1ttt42• 
Table Three 
i First Line Drugs for the First Line Drugs From the 
I Initial Year of Treatment Second Year of Treatment 
DmgName DmgName 







, Combination Tablets Triamune Triamune 
i Combivir 
'Dru Cost er Year of ! $295 $424 I g p 
Treatment 
This drug regime has been designed to allow at least two independent regimens, 
whilst still sufficiendy limiting costs. It is assumed that all rationally selected 
HAART regimens have equivalent treatment outcomes.s Where a combination 
tablet could substitute for individual medicines, the price of the combination 
tablet was included due to possible adherence advantages. lO 
t1it Prices have dropped by a greater margin than this in the last year in South Africa. Pressure by the 
National Department of Health, various AID agencies and NGO's such as the Treatment Action 











Based on the WHO recommendations91 the baseline costing model incorporates 
all tests (including a biannual CD4 count and a CD4 count prior to enrolment) 
with the exception of viral load tests. lO 
Virit costs for the antiretroviral treatment programme 
The lack of published cost data for public-sector ARV treatment programmes 
makes the cost of HIV treatment the health sector particularly difficult to 
estimate. However, given the reasonable assumption that clinical costs may be 
higher for HAAR T than for standard primary care consultations, the costing 
model applies a cost factor of 1.5 to the average primary care consultation costs 
in the Western Cape metropolitan area, where there is a doctor-driven primary 
health care service.:t.J:l:f:;lO 
A visit schedule based on the current Medicins Sans Frontieres (1vlSF) treatment 
protocol in the Western Cape52;53;91 is used to estimate the additional visits 
required to sustain HAART. The baseline visitation scenario in Boulle {It al,lO 
assumes that the majority of visits have a lower cost structure than a conventional 
doctor's consultation as the visit is principally to ensure adherence and dispense 
medicines.§§§§ The model further assumes that existing primary health care needs 
are provided for by the routine health services and are not costed as part of the 
intervention. 
It is plausible to assume that a proportion of Stage 3 HIV sufferers will make use 
of HIV / AIDS services i.e. before becoming AIDS-symptomatic. The baseline 
model sets this proportion equal to the proportion of patients accessing 
treatment when becoming AIDS symptomatic. Ibis results in a higher number 
:j:j:j:j: The full model includes a sensitivity analysis on this parameter 
§§§§ Boulle et af/o also include another visitation scenario in which a greater proportion of the visits takes place 
with a doctor and therefore has a cost structure. More detailed sensitivity analysis is also presented 











of visits to the HIV / AIDS servlces by people who are not on antiretrov1.rals 
(ARVs) in the initial years, reducing as a proportion of all visits over time as the 
numbers of people on ARV s accumulate. The model assumes 3 visits per year on 
average for those not on ARVs but attending the HIV / AIDS services as a 
prelude to possible enrolment into an ARV treatment programme. These visits 
are costed at the existing PHC consultation costs. lO 
The ASSA2000 AIDS and Demographic model2 was used to anticipate the 
numbers of HIV-infected people over the next ten years. This distribution was 
further segmented by \VHO clinical stage to identify the likely numbers of Stage 3 
and Stage 4 sufferers. A proportion of those who would otherwise become 
AIDS symptomatic (Stage 4) were assumed to move onto antiretroviral 
treatment. Probability distributions based on the median survival rate were used 
to determine the probability each year of changing treatment (only one regimen 
change is provided for in the baseline scenario), failing treatment, and dying based 
on the duration of treatment (see Figure One below). 
Figure One***'~ 
- Second line Rx 
- First line Rx 
- No Treatment D 
B 50%L ___ 5 __ _ 
2.5%'I_-_-_-_...;e.,;;..._-_---.......... Failing Rx 
-------...I;Stage IV 
LY gained per non-failing year on first line treatment: (B+C-A) / B = 0.85 
Source: S fides from Barcelona Presentation lO 











Placing programme costs within the DALY framework 
The sub~populations determining programme costs for the complete model are 
those who are on first~line treatment, those on second~line treatment, and those 
failing treatment. However, for the purposes of this example, we are only 
interested in the proportion of people who are on first line treatment and the 
proportion of those people who fail treatment (B and C in Figure One). 
This model yields a unit cost of approximately R5,600 ($562.81~ per person, 
per life year saved. Putting this unit cost into the DALY calculation framework 
(which is repeated below) yields the results summarised in Table Four. 
The DALY formula: 
DALY = [(D)(Ce-
fJa 
)][e-<p+rlL (1 + (B + r)(L + a)) (1 + (r + fi)a)] 
(fi +r)2 












Standard DALY caJculadon 
THE CASE WITH HAART THE CASE WITHOUT HAART 
First calculating the number of DALYs /nst to disability while in Stage Four of AIDS sickness 
Variable Variable Description Source of 
name Estimate 
C Constant 39 
D Disability weight:f:l:l:l:l: 14;35;39 
r Discount weight 3961 
~ Constant 39 
a Age when disability 14 (average age 
starts atHIV 
infection) * 
L Years lived with the 42;91 
disability 
e Constant 39 
DALYs lost = 1.53 
Now calculating the number of years lost to premature mortality: 
C Constant 39 
D Disability weight 14;39 
r Discount weight 39;61 
~ Constant 39 
a Age when the person 42;91 
dies 
L Years ofllfe lost due 61 
to premature death 
e Constant 39 
DALYs lost = 29.40 
Summary Figures from Table Four: 
Total DALYs lost due to HIV when on 
treatment 
















Variable Variable Source of 
name Description Estimate 
C Constant 39 
D Disability weight 14;35;39 
r Discount weight 39;61 
~ Constant 39 
a Age when 14(dedved) 
disability starts 
L Years lived with 42;91 
the disabilitv 
e Constant 39 
DALYs lost = 0.74 
C Constant 39 
D Disability weight 14;39 
r Discount weight 39;61 
~ Constant 39 
a Age when the 42;91 
person dies 
L Years oflife lost 61 
due to 
premature death 
e Constant 39 
DALYs lost = 31.66 
Total DALYs lost due to HIV without 
treatment 
1.4800 
Cost per DALY (R5,600 per year for 5 years divided 1:ry the total DALYs averted): R18,970.S7 


















itttI Ths disability weight is calculated on the assumption that a person is symptomatic when they present for treatment (thus 
having a disability weight equal to that of patients not on treatment (0.505)). Patients may not seek treatment immediately and 
treatment is not immediately effective so it is assumed that this weight is maintained for 6 months. The patient is then 
assumed to have a disability weight dose to zero (0.1) for 3.5 years before they start to fail on the medication and are once 











Using these figures as a basis, one can manipulate the assumptions of the DALY 
model to appreciate sensitivity of the calculation to changes in the 
assumptions. The discount tate, the life expectancy assumptions and the age 
weighting function are the three parameters which will now be varied in tum. 
Changing the discount rate ... 
In the fitst instance the discount rate has been reduced to zero.6;56;91 Reducing the 
discount rate to zero increases the number of DALY s averted by treatment, this 
decreases the program's cost per DALY and increases the implied cost 
effectiveness. 
Reducing the discount rate to zero: 
Total DALYs lost due to HIV when 
on treatment 
Total DALYs averted by treatment: 
Total DALYs lost due to HIV 
without treatment 
4.9795 
Cost per DALY (R5,600 per year for 5 years divided by the total DALYs averted): RS,623.03 
Cost pcr DALY in dollars**: $565.13 
In the second instance the discount rate has been increased to 10%.61 As one 
would expect, this manipulation has the effect oflowering the number ofDALYs 
averted by the project and hence dramatically raising the cost per DALY of the 
program. 
Increasing the discount rate to 10%: 
Total DALYs lost due to HIV when on 
treatment 
Total DALYs averted by treatment: 
Total DALYs lost due to 
HIV without treatment 
0.0353 
Cost per DALY (R5,600 per year for 5 years divided by the total DALYs averted): R 792,255.82 











Changing the life expectancy assumptions ... 
As this costing applies only to the South African context, it is interesting to 
consider the impact on the DALY of using the South African life expectancy 
rather than the higher, 'ideal' life-expectancy assumed by the standard DALY 
calculation. According to the World Bank:, South Africa's life expectancy for 
2000 was 47.8 years. lOt Using a simple calculation, the years of life lost are 
calculated as 47.8 less the age at death. The effect of this was somewhat 
surprising, instead of making the program cost -effective, it makes the 
program more cost-effective. This occurs because the difference between the 
numbers of D AL Y s with treatment and the number without treatment increases. 
Of course, this may simply be the case with this particular intervention. It is not 
suggested that this ",ill always be the case, however this finding makes the point 
that differences in life expectancy assumptions have implications for CUA 
findings. 
Total DALYs lost due to HIV when 
on treatment 
Total DALYs avetted f?:y treatment: 
Total DALYs lost due to 
HIV without treatment 
2.7152 
Cost per DALY (R5,600 per year for 5 years divided f?:y the total DALYs avetted): R 10,312.44 
Cost per DALY in dollars**: $1,036.43 
Changing the age weighting function ... 
Age weighting function = Cxe-Px 
As discussed earlier, there was some arbitrariness to the assignment of values for 
~ and C. According to Murray, value of ~ could in fact lie anywhere between 
0.03 and 0.05 - admittedly narrow bounds.61 Setting ~ equal to the lower bound 
has the effect of substantially increasing the burden of disease (the number of 
DALYs lost with and without treatment). It also reduces the "effect" of the 











Total DALYs lost due to HIV when on 
treatment 
Total D.ALYs at'erted by /reatment: 
Total DALYs lost due to HIV 
without treatment 
1.0143 
Cost per D.ALY (R5,600 per year for 5 years divided by the total D.ALYs averted): R27,604.9S 
Cost per D.ALY in doflars**: $2,774.37 
DALYs are designed to favour the economically active (and those who are age-
eligible to be economically active).61 This implies a human capital approach to 
human worth5;6 which should be treated with caution. As above example 
shows, this human capital approach can lead to an underestimation of the burden 
of disease in a community. Particular care should be taken in a country like South 
Africa which has been hit hard by the HIV pandemic. AIDS changes the age 
structure of the population resulting in an increase in child-headed households19;91 
and pensioners supporting many grandchildren. 19;91 People in countries like 
South Africa no longer have an equal chance of living to every age and one could 
argue that the DALY is biasing against the very age groups who are likely to hold 
fabric of society together in the of spiralling adult mortality amongst the 
working-aged (and sexually active) population. 
Furthermore, if one can justify structuring DALY to favour the working aged, 
then surely that same argument can extend to favouring the providers of essential 
services such as doctors and nurses, and the employed over the unemployed. In 











A FINAL WORD ON DALYS 
Parker and Fox-Rushby believe that it is inappropriate to assume that dimensions 
of health are identical across differing cultural environments. 66 They have three 
criticisms of generic methods such as the DALY: 
1. Firstly, most generic instruments were developed 1n wealthier countries 
such as the USA and Western Europe and as such they emphasize the 
inextricable link between health, well-being, individuality and autonomy. 
Parker and Fox-Rushby point to a large body of anthropological literature 
which suggests that in non-Western cultures, the different aspects of an 
individual's health may bear little relation to the way that individuals perceive 
their health and well being within a community. 
2. Secondly, all of these generic instruments are inevitably cultural 
instruments, yet the associated literature does not pause to consider what 
culture is. 
3. Finally, generic methods are constructed with scant attention to 
qualitative methods of data collection such as participant observation 
supplemented by unstructured and semi-structured interviews over time. 
These methods could add considerable value to the understanding of quality 
of life. 
Parker and Fox-Rushby return us to the trade mentioned earlier between 
accuracy of measurement within an homogenous context and comparability of 
measurements across heterogeneous contexts. They question the importance of 
international comparisons and urge regional decision makers to consider the cost-











Garratt et al 28 lend weight to the argument against generic measures of burden of 
disease. Their study concludes that in some specialities, there are numerous 
measures of quality of life and little standardisation. Of those patient-assessed 
measures of quality of life that were classifiable under the methodology their 
study, 46% were disease or population specific, 18% were dimension specific, 
10% were utility and 1 % were individualised measures. Only 22% of patient 
assessed quality of life measures could be classified as generic. 
At best the DALY might assist in optimising allocative efficiency within the 
health budget but it cannot assist in optimising broader allocative efficiencies in 
society. Cost utility analysis, as a sub-discipline of CEA, falls victim to the same 
key criticism: Wbile CUA can assist in the ranking of health interventions, CVA 
cannot advise a cut-off point or optimal program size for each intervention. Nor 
can CVA say anything about the positive impact that one intervention can have 
on another.54 
Furthermore, CVA and particularly the DALY can be guilty of obscuring more 
than it reveals. As the example above shows, changes in the discount rate, the life 
expectancy assumptions and the age weighting function can dramatically impact 
on the results and hence the practical implications of the model. Normative 
decision rules are being concealed "vithin an apparently complex, scientific 
procedure. Those normative decision rules could therefore be manipulated to 
suit the ends of special interest groups - and that manipulation is given certain 
credibility \vithin the DALY framework. 
By adding considerations of morbidity to those of mortality, the DALY has a 
valuable contribution to make; however, steps should be taken to ensure 
consistency in the application of assumptions and transparency regarding the 











delivery have fewer checks and balances, this consistency and transparency IS 
particularly crucial. 
Attempting to place eUA within the formal assessment matrix then: 
Figure Two: Positioning CUA within the assessment matrix 
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Chapter Six: Cost Benefit Analysis - The Human 
Capital Approach versus Willingness to Pay 
INTRODUCTION 
Cost benefit analysis attempts to monetise the costs and benefits of a health 
intervention:IO;91;95 The two principal methods for measuring health care benefits 
in a cost benefit analysis are the willingness to pay approach and the human 
capital approach.91 As the following discussion will show, both of these methods 
are particularly challenging to apply in developing countties. However, an 
emerging methodology known as the "net-cost methodology", may offer some 
direction for a new approach to measuring benefit83. An approach more suited to 
the developing country context. 18;20;33;40;76;79;80;84;88;95 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL APPROACH 
The human capital approach measures the benefit of an intervention in terms of 
an individual's future stream of income. The value of one life year is equated to 
an individual's annual salary and as such the value of a life saved or extended, is 
the sum of that income over the extended lifespan of the patient.91 Even this 
rather succinct explanation of the human capital approach raises an immediate 
problem: how does one value benefit for those who do not earn a salary?20;40;82;95 
The human capital methodology raises ethical concerns in countties with high 
unemployment rates. Similar concerns are raised when valuing interventions for 
women or children who are less likely to be economically active. A human life is 
valued only in terms of the money earned over its duration and this would serve 
as the objective function in an optimisation problem. Obviously this raises 
considerable moral and ethical objections, for example, is an honest low wage 











example may seem extreme but it makes the point that the value of individuals is 
not necessarily captured by the sum of their pay cheques. 
(( ... the human capital approach has several limitations. There is a lack if 
theoretical foundation, the intrinsic value and quality if life are ignored and 
the method discriminates against people outside the labour force." page 7°;91 
Ethical dilemma's aside, the human capital approach raises a number of technical 
difficulties such as how to treat retired persons and women who work in the 
home.82;91 Even among the employed the choice of an appropriate wage rate can 
cause a problem in the absence of comprehensive earnings data - a problem not 
uncommon in many developing countries. How does one decide on an 
appropriate minimum or standard wage for various forms of employment?82;91 
A study conducted in Israel29;91 offers one possible solution to these difficulties. 
Instead of looking at the salaries of the particular beneficiaries of a health 
intervention, these authors simply use annual GNI per capita. Tbis immediately 
levels the playing field between the employed and the unemployed, the 
economically active and the inactive. All members of that society are valued 
equally. Tbis circumvents many of the ethical problems implicit in the human 
capital approach but does not address the concern that a health intervention is 
not in place solely to maximise GNI. This solution would also not aid an 
institution such as the World Health Organisation who may need to make cross-
country comparisons as it would result in expenditure being biased towards 
wealthier countries - a phenomenon which makes little sense in an aid context. 
Thus, while this solution partly addresses intra-country comparisons, it does not 
solve the difficulty of inter-country comparisons. 
On the positive side, the human capital approach allows one to monetise directly 











not require lengthy questionnaires and there is little risk, if any, of respondent 
bias or over claim.82;91 Input data is more readily available in published form than 
that for the willingness to pay approach and as such requires less time and 
expense to compile.82;91 However, Johanneson and Jonsson40 point out that 
despite this appeal, 'rj the human capital approach was routinefy used as a basis for 
allocating health care resources, important misallocation rif resources would result, JJ (page 3). 
They see the only advantage of the human capital methodology is the 
contribution it has made to the calculation of direct and indirect medical costs. 
This was an important precursor to the development of cost-effectiveness 
analysis.4O;91 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
Very simply, the willingness to pay approach estimates the amount that an 
individual is prepared to pay to receive a particular health increment (i.e. not to 
receive perfect health or death).57;79;80;88;91 Common methods for measuring 
willingness to pay include the standard gamble, time trade off methods and 
standard analogue scale,§§§§§;13;7S;82;88;91 which fall under the ambit of contingent 
valuation (CV).57fJ1 Conjoint analysis can also assist in the establishment of 
willingness to pay, as can the observation of risk avoidance practises such as the 
amount paid on life insurance or for cars with airbags and other safety devices. 
Each of these methods try in different ways to identify the amount of value 
placed on a given health increment (or the avoidance of a health decrement).82;91 
The \villingness to pay approach is the most consistent with social welfare 
theory.20;40;57;91 By establishing how much an individual is "\villing to pay to gain a 
health increment (or avoid a health decrement) willingness to pay attempts to 
§§§§§ A more detalled explanation of these techniques falls outside the constraints of tills paper. For 











price the intervention at the point where the individual's marginal utility from the 
intervention is equal to the marginal cost of the intervention to the same 
consumer thus ensuring allocative efficiency. 
The willingness to pay methodology attempts to derive a convex utility function 
such as that commonly shown in Edgeworth box analysis and in so doing arrives 
at a Pareto efficient outcome with an accurate shadow price, undistorted by 
market failure and constrained only by the service provider's capacity to 
delivery.20;46;91 This can be done using the methods of compensating variation or 
. I .. 40'43'91 eqUlva ent vanatlOn. ' , 
'1j we are investigating willingness to pcry for a specific treatment, willingness 
to pcry is equal to the Hicksian compensating variation21 if the consumer is 
not initiallY undergoing treatment, and is equal to the Hicksian equivalent 
variation if the consumer is undergoing treatment. "pg 840;91 
In practice, a number of complications arise. For example, how is someone who 
currently does not suffer from asthma or HIV supposed to value asthma or HN 
treatment? How is someone who has lived all their life under a social health care 
regime (provided and paid for by the government) and has never paid for health 
care supposed to understand realistic prices for a range of interventions? These 
questions are particularly pertinent to the developing country context and reflect 
the oft cited difficulty of measuring health changes in monetary 
terms.40;58;59;61;79;80;84;91;95 
This difficult relates directly to a further criticism of the willingness to pay 
approach: the burden of obtaining the necessary data to compute willingness to 
20'40'57'91 Willin' f: h alth' .' b . d pay measurements "'. gness to pay lor e lnterventions 1s 0 tame 
from survey data. Questions can be asked in a number of ways - either by simply 
21 The reader is referred to Kreps 43;91 for a detailed explanation of the theory of compensatiog and equivalent 











asking how much a person would be "\villing to pay for a certain risk reduction 40;95 
or by asking the respondent to select between pairs of successive choices until the 
d .. difT h d ff d 20'91'95 respon ent IS 1n lerent to tetra e-o presente. ' , 
The second alternative raises a particular challenge in the developing country 
context as the researcher needs to generate a viable set of alternatives in 
environments where few treatments are likely to exist for anyone ailment. 
Regardless of how the question is asked, a number of other problems are likely to 
arise. In South Africa for example, the existence of eleven official languages 
poses an immediate problem, which language should the instrument be asked in? 
And does the question stand up to the translation? A further problem is the 
nature of interviewing conditions in many poorer or rural parts of the country 
where crowded h'\?ing and long distances between respondents complicate the 
process and increase the expense. Combine this environment with the usual 
respondent fatigue, add too the fact that the respondent is unlikely to understand 
how the information will be used, combine these shortcomings with the fact that 
the true risk of the tradeoffs presented may not be understood by the respondent 
- and one could righdy question whether the resultant data is likely to reflect the 
respondent's true utility function. 
Another frequent criticism of willingness to pay is its unavoidable reflection of 
ability to pay79;80;91 - $10 to a wealthy person is very different to $10 to a person 
living below the poverty line of $1 dollar a day. A wealthy person may be 
prepared to pay a substantial sum to reduce their risk of heart disease while a 
poorer counterpart may be more concerned with the immediate problem of 
feeding a family. The risk of heart disease at some future date is highly unlikely to 
be given considerable share of mind, or share of pocket, when the threat of 











In a society \vith a history of free (or reduced cost) health service provision, over 
claim is a particularly common problem '.Vith willingness to pay.6l;91 Respondents 
do not believe they will ever have to pay for the intervention they are valuing but 
they gain some positive utility from knowing that the service or intervention is 
available should they ever need it.57;79;80;88;91 As such, they over-value the service to 
increase the chances of its provision. Over-claim may also result in cases where it 
may be considered socially desirable to be prepared to pay all you have. For 
example, when being interviewed in a crowded living room about how much you 
would be willing to pay for an intervention to prevent measles in your children 
you may feel as though you should be prepared to pay anything to prevent the 
illness particularly if your mother in law is sitting next to you! 
A further problem '.Vith willingness to pay is the lack of an acceptable benchmark. 
How much is too much? How much is too little? 57;91 Respondents struggle to 
answer these questions and analysts frequently find themselves '.Vith the same 
dilemma. 
On the positive side, willingness to pay correctly conducted enables one to 
understand and even to rank individual and social preferences in a way that the 
revealed preferences methodology does not. 57;88;91 For example, if an individual is 
'.Villing to pay more to avoid waiting longer at a clinic than to receive more 
modern forms of treatment, this ordinal ranking, quite aside from the cardinal 
differential, allows one to allocate resources more consistently '.Vith individual and 
hence social preferences. Morrison and Gyldmark57;91 cite Gafni's24;91 three 
criteria for successful contingent variation that adheres to the requirements of 
social welfare theory: 
1. The respondent must be informed of the probability that they will ever 
need the service being valued. Willingness to pay questions must then be 











as an insurance premium to ensure that the service is available should 
they ever need it. 
2. A separate imperative is that the patient understands the probability of 
successful treatment if a treatment is ever undertaken. 
3. Finally, as willingness to pay should represent the willingness of a 
population, care should be taken to ensure the survey sample is 
representative of the treatment population. 
Morrison and Gyldmark use a number case studies to argue that, thus far, "these 
criteria have not generalfy been fulfilled in health-related CV studies and, even if they had been, 
the criteria themselves are not sufficient to obtain valid and usiful results from CV studies. "page 
237 57;91 
So, while willingness to pay may offer some advantages if correctly conducted, 
the informational and procedural requirements for that correct implementation 
may fall outside of the resource constraints of the average developing country. 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHS TO MEASURING BENEFIT 
It appears that little effort has been invested in fInding alternative ways of 
measuring benefIt and the willingness to pay approach remains popular in the 
literature. Murray and Salomon62 investigated the use of mathematical modelling 
to evaluate global TB control strategies but their approach cannot yet be 
generalised to other cases. Another approach which holds promise is that used 
by Nattrass in a polemic piece on mother to child transmission of HIV / AIDS in 
South Africa. Skordis and Nattrass83 further developed what has become known 
as the "net-cost methodology" and effectively applied it to a formal economic 











South Africa and the viability of an MTCT intervention such as AZT or 
N evirapine. 
The Net-Cost Methodology 
In brief, the net-cost methodology weighs the costs of a health care intervention 
to the provider, against the costs to the provider of "not intervening". The 
mother to child transmission case provided the perfect testing ground with the 
benefits to the public health care budget clearly outweighing the costs to the 
budget (or, put differently, with the cost of not intervening being highe.r than the 
costs of a basic MTCT intervention).83 However, the MTCT case was one of 
prevention rather than palliative care. Palliative care can be a very different health 
context to prevention but Boulle et alo have illustrated that the net-cost 
methodology can make a meaningful contribution to palliative care costing. 
To illustrate, we pick up on the example used to calculate sample DALYs in 
Chapter Four. The costing, as before, is for a baseline HAART program in 
South Africa and the results of the study have been summarised in Table Three 















Total Hospital, PHC and TB costs in 2007 with R15,988,193,906 
no ARV intervention 
ARV program costs in 2007 R140,302,366 
Total Hospital, PHC, ARV and TB costs in 2007 R15,970,134,904 
WITH ARV intervention 
Accumulated difference over 5 years between nil R-59,150,482 
and baseline scenarios 
Proportion of ARV costs potentially offset at 119% 
given time-point 
Source: Slides from Barcelona PresentattonlO 
Total Hospital, PHC and TB costs in 2007 with no ARV intervention have 
been calculated using the following assumptions (see Table Four): 
Table Four 
Units Stage Stag Stage ARV ARV Fail- Unit 
I&II eIII IV FL SL ing cost 
Min 
! Tuberculosis Annual 5% 17% 34% 2% 2% 34% $420 
Risk 
• Hospitalisation Inpatient 5.8 18.8 1.5 2.0 16.5 $45 
i dqys 
: PHC consultations Extra 8 13 2 2 13 $7 
consults 
ARV medicine Annual rost Full Full Half $421 
costs 
ARV laboratory Annual cost Yes Yes Yes $37 
costs 
ARV visit costs Visits 12 12 3 $82 
Source: Slides from Barcelona Presentation lO 
As with any model it is necessary to make assumptions and simplifications. One 
of the unfortunate but necessary - simplifications of this model is that it only 















could well be argued that HAART reduces the need for spending in other areas. 
For instance: 
• Amongst the employed, HAART may help to improve (or at least 
maintain) the productivity of HIV positive workers prolong their 
working lives thus reducing staff turnover and new training costs. 
This might comprise a substantial saving to both the private and public 
sectors. 
• There is also a growing concern in society about a large cohort of AIDS 
orphans 19 who may themselves be either HIV positive or negative. 
Keeping these childrens' parents alive might help to keep this cohort of 
children off the welfare system and out of state orphan care facilities. 
This may comprise a significant saving to the Welfare Budget. 
• Obviously, HAART does not cure AIDS but significantly delays the 
onset of debilitating illness and death. One could argue that this delay 
will have a discounting effect on the subsequent treatment cost once the 
patient fails on the treatment. This benefit is quite aside from the fact 
that five years is a long time in medical-development terms. \'Vho knows 
what new drugs, vaccines or cures may be developed in that period? 
Buying time is buying hope. 
net cost methodology, as it was employed Boulle et afO, fails to quantify these 
potentially substantive elements. The primary reasons for this are twofold: 
1. Firstly, the data requirements are substantial and, in some cases, 
costly to obtain. 
2. Secondly, capturing some of these benefits would reqUlte the 











revert us to the arguments against the assumptions implicit in the 
DALY calculation, that social norms differ too greatly from 
community to community to be easily quantified. 
The net cost methodology holds considerable potential but it needs further 
thought and investigation. Measuring the benefit of health interventions is 
arguably the area of the economic evaluation of health care which needs to most 
work. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarise and attempt to position CBA on the assessment matrix.: 
• The human capital approach has very poor theoretic foundations. 4o It is 
also particularly unsuited to the developing country context because of its 
bias against the unemployed and the measurement of human value in 
terms of streams of income. 
• The willingness to pay approach is consistent with social welfare 
th ?0'40'57 H thi firm £ da . dIll . eory.-' , owever, s oun tlon oes not trans ate we mto 
practice in the developing country context because of the relationship 
between willingness to pay and ability to pay, and the considerable data 
requirements for measuring willingness to pay. The same factors that 
prevent the theory translating into practice, make willingness to pay 
unsuited to the developing country context. 
• The net-cost methodology is best able to account for the allocative 
implications of health spending both within the health budget and 
between health and other budgets. The net cost methodology does take 











suffers from the same problem as willingness to pay in that the data 
requirements are considerable (and are often prohibitive). Only these 
data constraints prevent the net-cost methodology from being very well 
suited for the developing country context Skorclis and Nattrass83 have 
clearly shown how the methodology can assist in setting health priorities. 
Placing the various forms of CBA within the formal assessment matrix then: 
Figure One: Positioning CBA within the assessment matrix 
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Chapter Seven: Conciusion 
Cost minimisation, cost effectiveness, cost utility and cost benefit analysis are all 
able to contribute to tbe design and implementation of healtb policy. The key 
caution of this paper is not to overstate tbat contribution. Developing countries 
face particular resource constraints and different healtb priorities to tbeir 
wealthier counterparts. Resource constraints are often furtber exacerbated by 
information asymmetries between voter and politician as well as less tban perfect 
markets. The fact that many of tbe techniques discussed above consider one 
healtb problem in isolation, witbout considering tbe broader implications of tbe 
expenditure can be particularly problematic in the developing country context. 
As mentioned before, if the opportunity cost of tbe investment has not been 
accounted for, concrete policy recommendations would be ill advised in any 
setting. Many of tbe shortcomings attributed to tbe metbodologies discussed 
above might be overcome if tbe economic evaluation were conducted in a socio-
political environment in which issues such as budget allocations could be 
considered witbout tbe undue influence of special interest groups and influential 
institutions. Again, as mention before, this is seldom tbe case in tbe developing 
country context where new democracies are cautiously finding tbeir way and 
single party states or military dictatorships are not uncommon. 
Outside of perfect competition in all markets, tbe Pareto conditions for a social 
welfare optimum cannot apply and the policy maker is left to satisfice in tbe 
world of the second best. Satisficing usually necessitates tbe application of 
normative decision rules and this is where the economic evaluation of healtb care 
has value. By quantifying tbe economic implications of a healtb intervention in 
some appropriate way (even within tbe narrow context of tbe healtb budget as is 
tbe case witb cost effectiveness analysis and cost utility analysis), economic 











Inappropriate evaluation techniques (or even the inconsistent reporting of 
appropriate techniques) can however, have the opposite effect. In cost utility 
analysis, changes in the discount rate, age weighting assumptions, disability 
weighting assumptions and other variables can all effect the ultimate findings and 
hence, the recorrunended policy response. Explicit sensitivity analysis and more 
consistent treatment of assumptions will help to improve the value of economic 
evaluation in all contexts. 
These changes are, however, largely cosmetic. They do not address the key trade-
off mentioned at various points throughout this paper: namely the need for 
indicators that can be compared across differing contexts versus the need for a 
measure which accurately measures a problem within a particular context.65;91 
Composite BoD indicators such as the DALY are particularly guilty of favouring 
generic measurement over accurate, context-specific measurement. This bias has 
implications for recorrunended policy responses. 
Finally, care should be taken when applying the human capital and willingness to 
pay methodologies in the developing country setting. These methodologies can 
result in inequitable biases which, particularly in the case of South Africa, might 
be considered a contravention of human rights. The quote below, extracted from 
personal corrunurucation with a human rights lawyer, sets the tone for health care 











':5' ection 9(1) rif the Constitution specificallY recognises that everyone is equal 
bifOre the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit rif the law. 
Section 9(3) proceeds to prohibit unfair discrimination, whether direct or 
indired on a host rif grounds. The prohibition rif uifair discrimination rifers 
to both overt forms rif discrimination aJ weil as criteria which mqy be neutral 
on its face but, ultimatelY results in certain groups being disproportionatelY 
ciffected)) From personal communication with Karrisha Pillay, 
human rights lawyer.69 
The reader is reminded that the spatial differences between methodologies on the 
comparative matrix are the result of a qualitative assessment only which is, of 
necessity, a conceptual and hence a subjective framework. The specific co-
ordinates on the matrix aside however, the net-cost methodology appears to offer 
an alternative way of measuring health benefits which has not yet been fully 
exploited. It is possible that with further development, this may be the most 
theoretically sound and context-sensitive methodology of those assessed above. 
That said however, it is also possible, that the need to make assumptions about 
costs in order to reduce all variables to an equivalent monetized value could 
render the net-cost methodology \rulnerable to the same criticisms levelled against 
other methodologies. 
This paper thus serves to highlight two areas for future research. The first is in 
the development and testing of the net -cost methodology. The second is to meld 
the conceptual comparative framework into a more rigorous and objective form. 
Both of these areas will, however, require the generation or collection of data not 
currently available and as always, this may be a simpler proposition to make in 
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